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In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is offering too little and asking too much.
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HE most significant provision of the Revenue'Act of 1943 with
respect to renegotiation is the cut-off: renegotiation of war contracts is to terminate on December 31, 1944, or, should the
President so decide, not more than six months earlier or later than that
date.' Quite simply, Congress has decreed that procurement officials must
prepare to buy hundreds of thousands of different war products without
the aid of renegotiation-the principal sanction of procurement and also
its principal substitute for the economic controls of competition.
Renegotiation does serve as a sanction. A contractor who insists upon
a price which appears high, who demands a profit of twenty-five per cent,
or who refuses to submit satisfactory breakdowns of estimated cost-thus
taking advantage of the government's desperate need-may be (and
often is) told: "Very well, we need these supplies and we'll buy them at
your terms, but since your demands seem unreasonable, we intend to tell
the whole story to the price adjustment authorities." If the contractor
does not alter his position, he will discover in renegotiation that his pricing
policies are considered, and considered unfavorably, in determining a
permissible margin of profit. Renegotiation is also a remedy for the wartime lack of competition-one might almost say it is a safety valvewhich prevents the retention of monopoly profits by manufacturers engaged in war production. Renegotiation grew out of a nation-wide demand over a period of two decades to "take the profits out of war," and,
* "In truth, renegotiation is the conscience of procurement. The reasons for its existence are
the same that produced equity to ease the rigidity of the common law. The pangs of conscience
vary with circumstances. So with renegotiation." Renegotiation of War Contracts, Report of
the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 7 8th Cong., ist Sess., pursuant to
o

H. Res. 3 , at page 38.

t Renegotiator, Price Adjustment Section, Chicago Ordnance District. The opinions expressed here are those of the author. They are not to be taken as representative of War Department policy.

' Revenue Act of
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while it has not accomplished this mandate literally, it has gone far to
prevent profiteering and the consequent scandals which a majority of our
citizens associate with the last war. Because of the projected termination
of renegotiation, a new sanction must be devised and new-or rather
more elaborate-procurement techniques must seek to secure proper
prices at the outset and so prevent excessive profits from arising. In the
interim, in order to prepare procurement eventually to proceed alone,
renegotiation and procurement must be brought into closer relationship:
they must work together to control costs and profits. The question naturally arises, can procurement ever successfully do the job alone? That
question deserves discussion, but, since Congress has already answered
affirmatively, it is necessary first to find out how procurement can best
prepare for its ordeal.
Perhaps the most necessary change is a change in attitude on the part
of procurement officials and contractors alike. For renegotiation, while it
has resulted in a widespread realization that close pricing and moderate
profits are to be considered desirable, has also produced the attitude that
these goals need not be attained at the time a contract is negotiated. Will
not price adjustment see that they are attained in due course? While
some contractors are cooperating fully with the Government's efforts to
purchase at close prices, others regard overample provisions for contingencies in their bids and high profit margins as justifiable protectionthey want their risks as insignificant as possible. Procurement officials
themselves may be lulled into a feeling of false security: they are willing
to let renegotiation protect the Government from their errors and their
failure to secure reasonable prices. But these attitudes are not simply incidental, though unlooked-for, consequences of the Renegotiation Act.
They go much deeper. Fundamentally they indicate a failure to realize
that costs and concern about costs have something to do with efficient
production. These simple truths are overlooked and a purely mechanistic
theory of war production preferred, even by those who support the profitmotive economy, on the ground that it maximizes efficiency of production
and therefore production itself. Stated crudely, the mechanistic theory
runs something like this: give the producer what he wants by way of contract terms and prices, don't disturb him by inquiring into his internal
controls, don't question his cost estimates, and above all don't frighten
him by the fear of loss, for production is simply an engineering problem
of getting the materials, working them on machines, and assembling them
into final products. Prices and costs and all the paper work they involve
are at best necessary red-tape that can just as well (no, better!) be taken
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care of after the items are delivered to the Government. They must not be
allowed to interfere with production!
Of course, no one is likely ever to spell out such a theory, for, to quote
Mr. Justice Holmes, "practical men -generally prefer to leave their major
premises inarticulate. ' ' 2 The fact is that our entire economy would become hopelessly snarled if businessmen, both buyers and sellers, did not
pay attention to comparative prices and costs, for that attention is essential to the functioning of market machinery which determines the distribution and utilization of the factors of production. Efficient production,
as the economists use the term, means distribution of those factors among
producers and their employment by each producer in such a way as will
maximize utility. In wartime, utility must necessarily be related to the
demands of the government for war goods. If one manufacturer's scrap
losses are inexcusably high, he is depriving the government of some item
it needs; thus wartime utility is clearly not maximized. To be efficient,
therefore, the individual manufacturer must utilize his labor and materials without waste, or, to put the same thought another way, he must
keep to a minimum his material and labor costs per unit.
Uncontrolled costs mean wasted material and manpower. In peacetime
a manufacturer who wastes them loses ground competitively and eventually loses his shirt, as the bankruptcy figures testify. In wartime, with
essential materials and manpower so scarce, it is of the utmost military
importance that costs be controlled, and the surest way to guarantee this
result is to make the manufacturer's return dependent upon it: award
him a contract at a price calculated to cover costs and leave an adequate
profit, provided he controls costs and keeps waste to a minimum. The
contractor's natural incentive to maximize profit should do the rest: to
make a profit at all, he must do a good job; to increase that profit he
must do an excellent or a superlative job; but if he falls down-if he
wastes any critical molybdenum or rubber or tin, or if he makes the manpower shortage worse by hoarding labor-his anticipated profit will
shrink or disappear altogether. Where, however, the contractor is guaranteed an overgenerous profit from the start, incentive is absent. Since the
profit-motive economy normally implies an ever present threat of economic death to spur each producer, it is a strange logic indeed which urges
removal of that pressure in wartime on the ground that it will impede
production.
To see how renegotiation can serve as the connecting link between the
early, immature procurement methods, which inevitably resulted in in2 Collected Legal Papers 209 (1920).
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adequate pricing and unconscionable profits, and the procurement of the
future which must try to emulate normal competitive controls without
renegotiation, it is necessary first to study the problem historically: (I)
What economic circumstances made contract pricing so difficult and renegotiation so essential? (II) What techniques has renegotiation developed
which are of such importance to procurement?
I
The prices the Government pays for most war goods are monopoly
prices, and the profits realized by the suppliers are monopoly profits. For,
despite the fact that the Government is the only buyer, the market is a
seller's market, with each seller something of a monopolist. The war has
created such a need for military supplies of all kinds that even marginal
and submarginal producers can sell at a handsome profit everything they
can turn out. Each manufacturer's product is in a sense unique: he is the
only one who can produce it; as a portion of the war's requirements, the
Government must have it. There being no other supplier, there is no competition, and consequently price has almost nothing to do with equating
the forces of supply and demand. In contrast to the limitation placed upon
a peacetime monopolist by effective demand in the market, the war monopolist can often assume that demand is infinite, that he can sell all he
can produce. Hence there is no need for him to think (as the economists'
monopolist is said to think) in terms of how to maximize his returneither by setting the price high and selling a relatively small quantity or
by restricting quantity and letting demand bid up the price. Price and
sales volume are virtually independent variables.
It is true that an element of competition has remained. Although the Government relies almost exclusively upon negotiation rather than upon competitive bidding, it is customary to solicit proposals from a number of concerns before "negotiating" a contract with one of them, perhaps the low
bidder and frequently not. But the effective area for such "competition"
is severely restricted, for procurement is decentralized to a great extent,
and within the particular geographical area assigned to a local procurement office there may be only a very few producers capable of producing a
given item. Further, with more than enough business to go around, all the
producers who submit proposals may receive contracts, regardless of how
their prices compare. Not infrequently price is a very secondary consideration. Questions of manufacturing capacity and experience, ability to
meet production schedules, labor supply-all are of greater importance
than price. The military necessity for speed in procurement and produc-
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tion has often precluded paying too much attention to price. All of which
made good sense.
Even if there had been the time and the inclination to scrutinize proposals carefully in the early days of the war, there would not necessarily
have been an opportunity to analyze cost estimates intelligently. Many
war products were new and unusual, had never been produced before, and
called for working with strange materials and to very close tolerances.
Often they had absolutely nothing to do with the normal peacetime operations of a contractor: former refrigerator manufacturers, stovemakers,
gasoline engine assemblers, and radio companies are all making ordnance
fuses. Consequently, both the would-be producer and the Government
had to guess at costs, and this guessing game was made all the more difficult by the Government's reserving the right to make changes in specifications and schedules at any time. As a final unsettling element, negotiation might precede production by as much as six or eight or ten months.
These factors made for great fuzziness in cost estimates and for the inclusion of allowances for contingencies ordinarily more than sufficient to
meet probable increases in costs and other hazards.
Subject to these qualifications there was an opportunity for bargaining
between the parties. The Government might properly seek to bring a
price down when it seemed badly out of line (with other prices arrived at
in the same fashion), or it might insist upon the insertion of a pricing
article which would permit readjustment of the price after production
information indicated how high the original estimates had been.
It is in keeping with the fitness of things and the writings of political
scientists on sovereignty to think of negotiation with the Government as a
process of treating with Donald Nelson or Robert Patterson, whose authority to deal firmly with a private company can, if need be, find support
from the White House itself. Surely in such a situation the hapless businessman is in a poor bargaining position. Surely the Government holds all
the aces. In practice, however, this picture requires modification, for in
fact everything from the deuces up may be wild. Far from the Government's being in a position always to overawe the contractor, ,the reverse is
often the case. The civil servant or second lieutenant who actually does
the negotiating for the Government cannot throw much weight around.
He must conform to generally accepted procurement customs which place
great emphasis upon serving the contractor and assisting him in working
out his problems. His job frequently becomes routine, for the volume of
work to be handled makes impracticable devoting sufficient time and
facilities to analyzing the contractor's estimates, and no matter how long

RENEGOTIATION-A CONSCIENCE FOR PROCUREMENT

235

the negotiator sticks at the game he will never know as much about the
contractor's business as the contractor does. Then, too, he may encounter
company officials-particularly those of certain large and influential concerns-who consider local procurement offices as bothersome obstructions
to be by-passed. And he may be afraid to tempt the company into appealing over his head, for fear that he will not be supported by his superiors.
Under these circumstances it is a bit difficult to feel sorry for anyone having to sell to the Government. Selling in a seller's market to a customer
who needs everything you have to offer and who, in any event, is in a poor
administrative position to bargain, is just a little like taking candy from
babies.
Excessive profits are thus natural. Even if the market had been less of
a monopolist's paradise, even if the Government had not deliberately
reduced the risks of war producers far below the level of normal peacetime risks, 3 even if cost estimates had been estimates and not guesses,
excessive profits would still have arisen. For the Government purchased
item by item, contract by contract, ten thousand dollars today, eight
hundred thousand tomorrow, and fifteen million next week. A producer
who thought in terms of a sales volume of five million for the year might
at any moment be asked to double production on one item and triple output on another. And one procurement agency alone can be responsible for
such a circumstance. The producer, however, can sell to six or seven
branches of the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and a few
others as well. Consequently no one purchasing agency, much less one
negotiator charged with procurement, ever has the faintest idea of the
overall effect of war contracting on a company's costs and profits.
The producer himself was only slightly less confused. His volume might
balloon far beyond his fondest hopes and so permit him to spread his relatively fixed overhead expenses against many times the estimated dollars of
sales. Calculating in January that his annual volume would reach five million dollars, he might apportion one-fifth of his estimated general and ad3The Government has devised special short-cut contracts to enable contractors to begin
work prior to entering into definitive agreements; furnished an enormous amount of machinery
and tooling; utilized special pricing articles designed to afford protection against unexpected
cost increases; devoted a great deal of attention to contract provisions and procedures for saving contractors whole in the event of termination or changes in specifications and schedules;
expanded the concept of excusable delay; provided working capital through advance payments
and V loans; and set up a system for extraordinary relief under the First War Powers Act and
Executive Order gooi. It is safe to say that the risks of prime contractors, at least, have been
more than adequately taken care of.
A detailed treatment of the subject of risk distribution in procurement contracts will be
found in an article by the author and Lt. David Fain entitled War Procurement-A New Pattern in Contracts, in 44 Col. L. Rev. 126 (1944).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

ministrative expenses to a contract for one million dollars. By June, however, he might be shooting for a ten million volume and so charge a tenth
of his newest estimate of general and administrative costs to the latest
contract for a million dollars. When December rolls around, it is not unlikely that the company's government contracts have covered these expenses for the year two or three times over. The surplus naturally shows
up as profit. While material and direct labor costs per item can be estimated with some assurance, factory overhead or burden, and more especially general and administrative expenses per item, have no reality
except as they develop over a fiscal period. With volume so uncertain, the
natural tendency is to overestimate these costs on each contract, even
apart from any deliberate inclusion of allowances for contingencies.
The Government has initiated policies designed to remedy many of
these shortcomings. To a limited extent, moreover, the changed circumstances of the market have placed it in a better bargaining position: on
certain items for which the need is not critical, procurement agencies can
now pick and choose among producers; and the increasing number of
terminations-which reflect the shifting requirements of war--give the
Government an opportunity (in theory at least) to cancel out the highprice and relatively inefficient producers. Greater emphasis is being
placed upon analysis of the contractor's proposals, especially his breakdown of estimated cost, which can be compared with the actual results
on his previous contracts and with the operations of comparable contractors. His price can be compared with that currently proposed by others.
The difficulty is that the standards are uncertain, there being so many different factors which affect the real price to the Government as contrasted
with the money price: volume, government-owned equipment, government financial assistance, special pricing articles for adjusting the contract
price in light of actual production experience, free-issue material, mandatory changes which alter the specifications, and shifts in schedule. Just
because two companies produce the same item for the same price does not
mean that the Government has an equally good bargain with each of them.
Yet weighing the factors that affect the real price is not easy: which is
better for the government-a $5.oo unit price subject to upward as well
as downward revision or a $5.oo price not.subject to revision but which
contemplates the Government's furnishing free-issue material valued at
$o.i3 per unit? It must be remembered, too, that comparing one price with
another price or with a range of prices only establishes its relative correctness in terms of that price or that range, the worth of which must be
proved by some outside standard. A $5.00 price in a range from $4.98 to

RENEGOTIATION-A CONSCIENCE FOR PROCUREMENT

237

$6.12 seems reasonable. But it is most unreasonable if the range should be
$3.22 to $4.36. The outside standard necessarily must have something to
do with the question-how much should it cost contractors A, B, C, D, and
E to produce this item, considering their capacities, skills, contemplated
volumes, and all the other relevant factors? To answer requires a study
of costs in each plant far more exhaustive than the press of war procurement ordinarily allows.
The excess-profits tax is definitely no solution, even with a top bracket
4
of ninety-five per cent, subject to an overall ceiling of eighty per cent.
The factor of sales volume is so striking that even though a company can
keep only twenty-eight cents of every dollar of profit (including postwar
credit), enough money comes in to leave it with profits which, expressed
in terms of net worth, are shocking. As an example take a company whose
average sales for the period 1936-39 were less than a million, whose average profit before taxes for that period was less than six per cent of sales,
and whose largest net profit (after taxes) was just $5o,o0o. In 194o sales
increased to $i,5o0,ooo and profits to ten per cent, in 1941 to $4,400,000
and twenty-five per cent. Profits after taxes were $9o,ooo in 194o and
$34,000 in 1941. In 1942, however, the company's sales rose to $23,o0o,o0o
(almost one hundred per cent war work), profits before taxes to $8,ooo,ooo,
and profits after taxes to over $2,ooo,oo0, which represented a return of approximately 300 per cent on net worth. It must be noted, moreover, that
net worth at the beginning of 1942 was at least double the average net
worth for the 1936-39 period, chiefly because of the large profits the company earned on war work in i94o and 1941. And in 1942 the par value of
the outstanding capital stock was only $225,o0o. To be sure, this is an
extreme case, but the recent report of the minority of the Senate Finance
Committee indicates that there are hundreds of similar cases.3
In these circumstances, renegotiation or something like it was a political
must. The worst by-products of emergency procurement, indefensible
profits, had to be recaptured and their recurrence made less likely. "The
real choice is between renegotiation and war profiteering." 6 Renegotiation
has successfully weathered at least three Congressional investigations,
and each time it has emerged strengthened despite unrelenting efforts to
secure its emasculation or repeal. It is an integral part of a farflung assault upon inflation. It is as necessary to our wartime economy as rationing. It is indispensable to our fighting morale.
4The provision for postwar credit of ten per cent of the excess-profits tax makes the actual
ceiling about seventy-two per cent.
s S. Rep., Part 2, 78th Cong., ist Sess. at 15-16.

6 Ibid., at 4.
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Since renegotiation was originally drafted as a pricing measure, and
since its administration made it appear a supertax, many of its opponents
have condemned it with a sweeping "either-or" type argument: it must
be either a pricing measure or a taxing measure; experience demonstrates
that it concerns itself primarily not with prices but with refunds of profits
already made; therefore, it is a tax. Since it obviously lacks the standards
essential to sound taxation, it should be repealed. Unfortunately for this
conclusion that renegotiation is a tax, it just isn't so. Renegotiation is not
a taxing device; it is not designed to raise revenue; and as a matter of fact,
the less its honest enforcement turned back to the Treasury, the happier
everyone would be, inasmuch as the absence of refunds would be at least
an indication of proper prices. Just because renegotiation takes money
from war contractors does not make it a tax, any more than a contract
redetermination article which requires a refund in the event of overpricing is a tax.
Renegotiation does not fit neatly into any category. Essentially it is a
pricing measure, even though for administrative reasons it has operated
chiefly on the profit rather than on the cost aspect of prices, and on overall
war profits rather than on profits on particular items or contracts. Inflated
profits necessarily mean inflated prices, although it does not follow that
adjustment of the profit downward achieves the correct price, for costs
may be inflated as well. But it is unquestionably easier to operate on
profits. It is easier to determine that a company's profit is too high than to
conclude that its maintenance and repair expenditures are unreasonable.
Equally important, the job of adjusting a contractor's prices item by
item, contract by contract, would have been nearly impossible, since it is
not unusual for one manufacturer to be supplying half a dozen different
agencies of the Army and the Navy, and the variety of the products may
be startling--all the way from mess trays to landing mats to high-explosive shells. If each procurement agency undertook to reprice its own items,
the poor contractor would be harried indeed, although at the same time he
would have a golden opportunity to juggle costs as between one contract
and another. Consequently, it was inevitable that renegotiation should be
undertaken on an overall basis, that it should look at the entire operation
for a fiscal year to see how much profit the contractor made on all his war
business. If the profit appears too high, renegotiation reduces it and persuades the contractor to reduce prices so as to prevent unreasonable
profits in the future. One additional reason for this approach needs mention. The vast majority of war producers perform most of their war work
on a subcontract basis, they are often far removed from the procure-
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ment agencies, and their operations and products are not known at first

hand. To adjust their prices item by item would be harder by far than to
try repricing by that approach on prime contractors. And many are suppliers of substantially the same items they made in peacetime, selling
according to standard price lists through wholesalers and jobbers. There
is an understandable inclination on their part-although not therefore a
defensible one-to maintain those price lists unchanged, despite increased
volume and higher profits. Overall recapture certainly afforded a more
feasible way to deal with these producers.
When a contractor refunds $5oo,ooo, his sales to the Government as
well as his profits are reduced by that amount. The effect is thus to reduce
the end-price to the Government by cutting the profit on the total quantity of items purchased from that contractor during the year, and the total
end-price is cut regardless of whether the company produces only one
item or a great variety of products. Of equal importance, renegotiation
operates on subcontractors and suppliers all the way down the line. Taking excessive profits from them further affects prices, for what these subs
and suppliers charge are costs to prime contractors. And, although it is not
true in all cases, many renegotiation agreements oblige contractors and
subcontractors to reduce their prices in order to prevent the recurrence of
excessive profits. For example, let us assume that X, a prime contractor
charging $io.oo for a war product, purchases a component part from Y
for $2.oo. Both X and Y refund excessive profits and agree to reduce their
prices. As a result of these adjustments at the prime and subcontract
levels, the new price to the Government reflects a reduction not only of
X's profit but also of his costs.
What is more, profit percentages allowed in renegotiation tend to serve
as ceilings for estimated profit in new contracts. Some contractors still insist upon a comfortable profit cushion, ordinarily in the form of contingency allowances, but many are taking their contracts on closer margins,
realizing that they cannot keep profits above a certain amount. It must be
emphasized, however, that simply because a contractor was allowed ten
per cent in renegotiation is no reason for awarding him new contracts on
an estimated ten per cent profit basis. Perhaps the easier, more routine
continuation orders should be pared down to five per cent, whereas newer
and more risky ventures should go forward on an estimated twelve or
fifteen per cent profit basis.
It is not simply coincidence that the first really considerable reductions
in the prices of many war products occurred after contractors began to
feel the effects of renegotiation, along in the first half of 1943. At that

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

time a large number of the principal prime contractors made substantial
renegotiation refunds and reduced current prices, and others, realizing
that their turn was next, made voluntary refunds and forward price reductions in order to establish presentable records to show to the price
adjustment boards. These voluntary reductions continued throughout
1943. Consequently, any estimates of the total savings accomplished by
renegotiation cannot stop at refunds and reductions in current prices required by renegotiation agreements; they must also include the voluntary
price reductions and the scaling down of prices on new awards, which were
largely due to the awareness of contractors that renegotiation would get
the money sooner or later anyway. Thus to renegotiation must go a large
share of the credit for the substantial unused appropriations recently reported by the War Department.
This discussion offers an appropriate occasion for a few comments on
one of the most confusing (perhaps deliberately so) arguments about renegotiation. Critics have constantly asserted that renegotiation should be
after taxes-that it should be frankly recognized as a supertax and so
review a contractor's profits after he has paid his taxes. A refinement of
this position asserts that federal income and excess profits taxes are really
operating costs like wages and depredation. Figures have been concocted
to show that profits after taxes (expressed in percentages to sales) were
really smaller in I942 and 1943 than in any of the pre-war years. Not only
does this argument ignore the volume factor, it tries to pass over the fact
that wartime tax rates are at all-time highs.
The real result of the after-tax approach would be to have the Government pay the contractor's income and excess profits taxes as part of the
contract price, for taxes would be added to costs, and profits would be
something in addition. The increased price of war goods would just equal
the revenue received through income and excess profits taxes from war
contractors, and the real cost of these items would have to be paid by
other means. If procurement and renegotiation operated in this fashion,
the excess profits tax would be inflationary with a vengeance, for in the
entire war-goods field it would automatically result in higher prices. But
aside from wholesale avoidance of the tax burden by war contractors, renegotiation after taxes would mutilate the Government's effort to purchase scientifically and at proper prices. If, for a given item, material,
labor, burden, and a properly allocable portion of general and administrative and selling expense total $0.93, and an additional $0.07 is considered
proper for estimated profit, the price to the Government should be $i.oo,
not $i.oo plus a portion of the contractor's tax liability. The taxes to be
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paid by the contractor have nothing to do with the question of a fair price
to the Government. Differences in the tax bases of contractors ought not
lead to different prices for their products (assuming the other factors to be
equal), and any tax inequity as between companies should be remedied,
not through renegotiation, but through appropriate changes in the revenue laws. Furthermore, to allow in the contract price an item of cost to
cover the contractor's taxes would require a remarkable degree of clairvoyance, for taxes are not known until the end of a year, whereas contracts must be awarded currently and prospectively throughout the year.
Worse yet, the excess profits tax is a tentative tax subject to revision in
later years.7 And finally, the efforts of renegotiation to reward the efficient
would be fruitless if the primary determining factor were the contractor's
tax base. 8
Quite rightly, renegotiation officials have asserted that it is the job of
Congress to determine who shall bear the burdens of war taxes and how
great those burdens shall be. War contractors are already more fortunately placed than many individuals in our society-the soldier who gave up
his job or business or professional practice, the manufacturer who could
not adapt his plant to war work, the owner of a service-station. To give
them now the extraordinary privilege of relief from part or all of their tax
burden would be inexcusable. There is no doubt that some producers have
deliberately upped their prices in order to absorb increased tax rates. If
they were selling to private parties, the effect would be to shift the incidence of the tax, much as sales taxes are shifted, even those phrased as
retailers' occupational taxes. But when the principal customer is the
Government, the effect is to nullify the increased tax rates. It is baffling
indeed that otherwise staunch defenders of Congressional prerogatives
should be almost eager for the will of Congress to be flouted so obviously.
Ii

°

The value of renegotiation as a procurement device lies, chiefly in its
ability to review the results of a completed fiscal period and thereby to
assess the performance of the contractor and, necessarily, that of procurement officials as well. Such an appraisal is invaluable to future contracting,
7The loss carry back and special amortization spread back provisions, among others, make
likely extensive adjustment of taxes after the war.

8 Under present tax rates renegotiation cannot rectify tax inequities. An efficient producer
with an inadequate tax base will inevitably be worse off after taxes and renegotiation than a
mediocre producer with a very fortunate tax base. Psychologically, therefore, the reward to the
efficient must be in terms of profits before taxes.
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both because of the vantage point of renegotiation and because of the
type of data utilized by renegotiation.
Renegotiation looks at the contractor's war business as a whole, and
not contract by contract. Thus renegotiation officials can see what effect
war business has had on the nature of the contractor's operations and his
volume, and the effect of that volume on his costs and methods of controlling costs. The contracting officer who awards one contract at a time
is in no position to envisage these overall consequences. The engineering
and fiscal personnel of any one procurement office are similarly handicapped.
Renegotiation affords an opportunity to compare the contractor's performance with that of others engaged in the same type of war production.
This follows naturally from the effort in renegotiation to have the same
price adjustment section handle similar manufacturers; and in each individual section, comparable companies may be assigned for renegotiation
to the same negotiator and financial analyst. Thus renegotiation may permit determining for the first time which contractor is really the low-price
and low-cost producer-bearing in mind all the special factors which make
such judgments difficult.
Renegotiation permits studying the contractor's method of pricing on
government business, and especially the means by which he allocates
general expenses to that business. Actual cost figures which indicate that
these expenses are markedly lower than the contractor has consistently
estimated constitute a basis for insisting that the contractor reduce these
allocations on future bids. Glaring inconsistencies between results and
estimates may indicate that the contractor does not take seriously the job
of pricing or that his cost system is hopelessly inadequate or out-of-date
for the job. It may even happen that the contractor is not aware of his
deficiencies on that score. His becoming aware of them through renegotiation can lead to a thorough overhaul of his entire costing and pricing
system.
Renegotiation in most cases can secure costs by products and even by
contract, which apart from renegotiation are difficult to obtain. Thus procurement officials can learn from production experience what would have
been a proper price for an item, and such knowledge is a necessary starting point for future awards. It serves, moreover, as a check upon the reliability of the particular contractor's estimates, and product costs submitted by different contractors can be compared and possible sources of
savings suggested by the differences disclosed.
Renegotiation affords the first occasion when financial and operational
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data can be assembled, correlated, and analyzed. Problems and answers
both, which otherwise would remain buried, can be uncovered: an inefficient producer's troubles may show up in high scrap losses, in unnecessarily high overhead charges, or in labor costs out of proportion to those
required by other producers of the same item. The producer whose production record is poor or erratic is almost always the producer whose costs are
not controlled, and that fact will show up in the financial data submitted
for renegotiation. Production and procurement personnel may have their
own ideas as to the trouble prior to renegotiation, but only operational
figures can definitely disclose many of the most likely causes of inefficiency.
Renegotiation looks at specific cost items, particularly those which are
under the direct control of the management. For example, a contractor
may be maintaining a large sales force, including branch offices. Although such a force is only remotely connected with war business, the contractor may be charging to every contract a portion of the amount needed
to cover its maintenance. The company may have instituted an executive bonus arrangement which pays unreasonable sums to the principal
officers. It may appear that the contractor is throwing into cost estimates
amounts for accelerated depreciation greater than those to which he is entitled, or he may be incurring unnecessary repair and maintenance expenses. Thus the costs charged to government business are subject to
scrutiny. If they appear questionable, renegotiation can demand and
secure explanations. If the explanations are not satisfactory, renegotiation
agencies acting under the original act could disallow as charges against
renegotiable business all expenses beyond reasonable amounts. The
amendments just enacted require that deductions for tax purposes permitted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue be allowed as costs for renegotiation.9 Inasmuch as renegotiation for 1943 will take place long before the bureau has audited 1943 tax returns, renegotiation agencies must
now judge what the bureau will and will not allow, and they can take into
account unreasonable salaries and costs in determining what is a permissible margin of profit. Certainly the contractor who controls controllable
costs should be rewarded and the contractor who inflates these charges
penalized.
Renegotiation can give recognition to the element of risk. A contractor
who consistently contracts at a high margin, with a very comfortable
9"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, all items estimated to be allowable
as deductions and exclusions under Chapters i and 2 E of the Internal Revenue Code ....
shall, to the extent allocable to such contracts and subcontracts .... be allowed as items of
cost ..... " Revenue Act of 1943, tit. VII, § 403 (a) (4) (B).
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cushion as protection against possible cost increases, is taking very little,
if any, risk. He should therefore be entitled to little beyond a management
fee, much as the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor is paid. By and large the
holder of a prime contract is well protected against most of the risks of
doing war business. A subcontractor or supplier, on the other hand, may
incur a very substantial risk through greatly expanded inventory. By
giving effect to such variations in risks, renegotiation can relate risks to
pricing.
Renegotiation can tackle the problem of the pyramiding of profits. A
completed item entails extensive subcontracting: each major subcontractor decentralizes his part in the production job to sub-subs, who likewise
farm out part of the work, and so on through several more tiers of subcontractors and suppliers. Each contractor in the series takes a profit,
with the result that the total amount of profit earned by all constitutes a
large portion of the end-price of the item. By scaling down the profits of
subcontractors and suppliers, renegotiation can successfully reduce profit
on profit.
Renegotiation can help evaluate certain procurement policies. It should
be of assistance, for example, in determining whether contracting on a
short-term basis and scheduling continuation orders to maintain uninterrupted production results in lower prices (as it should) than does a
policy of awarding contracts for six months' or a year's requirements. It
should likewise reveal whether the inclusion of an upward-downward
price adjustment article really leads to the elimination of most contingency allowances (as it should).
Renegotiation can uncover true hardship situations which require the
immediate attention of procurement officials. Occasionally a company
becomes badly overextended through large investments in fixed assets
needed to expand production. Especially in the case of a subcontractor
dealing with many prime contractors working for different procurement
agencies, such hardship circumstances may escape the attention of procurement personnel. But renegotiation cannot fail to encounter them, although it is far from able to provide a cure.
Finally, renegotiation can supply incentive. It is the announced policy
of the renegotiation agencies to reward the efficient low-cost and lowprice producer, and a conscientious effort is made in practice to achieve
this end; recognized efficiency does receive a higher allowable profit percentage. Many contractors may need reminding that claiming efficiency
and demoilstrating efficiency are two entirely different things. But more,
by starting war producers on the road to cose pricing, renegotiation can
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make it important for contractors to control costs and thus can become
one instrument for the application of pressures which ordinary peacetime
competitive conditions supply. So long as prices provide sufficiently ample
protection against risks, contractors will tend to be indifferent to the
prices they pay suppliers and will fail to seeany need to control costs within their own plants. Renegotiation operates initially on profits, seeking in
that manner to affect prices first and then costs, but it can also influence
costs more directly. In both ways it can and should help restore the pressures which stimulate the manufacturer's drive to efficiency.
Of the various points just mentioned, four especially merit further discussion, particularly since they throw light on the importance of renegotiation as a distinctive vantage-point in the procurement process: (i) the
study of the contractor's cost system; (2) the analysis of product costs;
(3) the scrutiny of particular costs; and (4) the attack on the pyramiding
of profits.
Renegotiation interests itself in a contractor's cost system in the course
of determining whether the allocation of costs between renegotiable and
non-renegotiable business is fair and reasonable. Since it is to the contractor's interest to make his profit on renegotiable business appear as
low as possible, he may allocate costs with that end in view. Consequently,
examination of the method used in the allocation along with the cost system which presumably led to or justified that method is essential. The
first problem pertains to the cost of sales:
The cost of sales is departmentalized by the company. The direct labor cost incurred
in each department is actual and is allocated to the product directly. Direct material
charges are computed from invoices supported by both subassembly and final assembly cost sheets and are then recorded on the cost department copies of each sales invoice. Factory burden is computed by departments under three classifications: direct
manufacturing groups, indirect service departments, and functional expense groups.
The first classification is allocated monthly to the general product groups on the basis
of direct labor. The two latter classifications are allocated to the producing departments on the basis of service rendered, power consumed, etc.
This excerpt from a report of renegotiation should be of value to procurement officials in considering future proposals from the company, since it
indicates that the company maintains product costs, and estimates based
upon that system should be reliable. Furthermore, such information can
be of very real assistance to the contracting officer when he must determine the adequacy of a contractor's cost system as a prerequisite for the
use of a periodic price adjustment article. Certainty that the contractor's
system is good is most necessary when part of the contract may be exempted from renegotiation. Or consider the following:

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
The method used in determining costs by products is the same as has been employed
by the company for many years. It is a shop order system whereby products were put
through in lots of several thousand per order. Direct labor is on an actual cost basis,
as is direct material. Factory burden is applied on a standard rate basis using both a
general rate for the entire plant and departmental rates on a productive hours basis.
As there has been very little difference between the commercial business conducted by
the company and the manufacture of items which now have government end-use, it is
felt that this method is applicable to the company's normal products. The contractor
gained considerable experience in producing Ordnance items prior to 1942, so that the
standard rates did not have to be adjusted materially at the end of the year. The adjustment which was made arose from the fact that standard factory overhead exceeded
the actual factory overhead during 1942.

From this it appears that the contractor employs standard burden rates
which are quite dose to actual rates, largely because of the continuity of
production. Where, however, changes in a manufacturer's operations
make necessary substantial adjustment of standard rates at the year end,
renegotiation and procurement personnel might appropriately suggest
that the contractor review and revise his cost system. One contractor, for
example, admitted that his main office had taken a heavy loss by transferring component parts to a branch office at costs based on out-of-date
standard rates.
General and administrative and selling and advertising expenses are
generally allocated on some more or less arbitrary basis. In the course of
this allocation particular expenses such as provisions for bad debts,
salesmen's commissions on commercial business, and insurance premiums
can be allocated directly to non-renegotiable business:
Selling and advertising and general and administrative expenses were allocated between renegotiable and non-renegotiable business on the basis of cost of sales, as were
service expenses, engineering, and experimental expenses. Royalties were allocated as
a direct cost to the product to which they applied. A provision for bad debts was
charged entirely to non-renegotiable business.
An alert procurement negotiator could use this brief statement in any
analysis of future cost breakdowns.
Of even greater importance are product costs. Procurement is frequently unable to obtain complete breakdowns on previous contracts, for contractors say that they do not accumulate costs by product or that they are
too busy to be bothered. In renegotiation, however, it is relatively easy to
determine whether such detail is obtainable, and even if the contractor
does not utilize product costs for purposes of internal control, he may be
able to compile the figures upon request. 0nly rarely will he persist in
balking when requested by a price adjustment board. The following discussion of a particular allocation problem is enlightening:
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The question of cost allocation presented an extremely difficult problem. The sudden increase in profit in 1942 provided reasonable ground for assuming that the profit
on renegotiable sales was substantially higher than on commercial sales. The company
submitted evidence that in its normal commercial product prices had risen from forty
per cent to sixty per cent in 1942 over 1941. The financial analyst and the negotiator
were satisfied that part of the unusual profit on commercial sales was due to the liquidation of inventory, the value of which had been understated or had risen sharply as a
result of the change in market conditions in 1942 as compared with previous years.
The company engaged independent accountants to make a study of the time and
material costs of the principal war product. In the opinion of the financial analyst and
the negotiator, this study was honestly, accurately, and conscientiously made.

Here, surely, cost information was obtained which normal procurement
procedures could not secure, even if the item had been on a prime rather

than a subcontract.
Comparison of product costs for a completed fiscal period with the
breakdown on a proposed award does not solve problems-rather it suggests questions. For example:
1942

1943

Experience

Proposal

Materials ..............
Labor .................
Burden ................

$143-52

$162.92

75-78
82.61

82.03
83.64

Administrative .........

7.92

7-92

Totat costs .............
Profit .............

309.83
63.77

336.51
37-40

Price ..............

$373-60

$373.91

At first sight the new price appears satisfactory. Examination reveals,
however, that the estimate for materials has increased 13-5 per cent and
for labor 8.2 per cent. The estimated profit is io per cent. Since actual
production results show a profit of 17.07 per cent, it is certainly possible
that the increased estimates for labor and materials are not justified by
likelihood of higher costs, and that they were upped primarily for the
purpose of making the contemplated profit appear moderate. At the very
least, the procurement negotiator should investigate. The estimate for
administrative expenses should likewise be checked, for analysis by the
price adjustment section revealed a consistent decrease ever since the
Government took over the entire production of the plant, thus permitting
a large reduction in selling costs, and comparison of actual costs with
earlier estimates revealed consistent overestimating. The new proposal,
moreover, is based upon an anticipated increase in production.
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In the following instance the company submitted a series of proposals
for virtually its entire war production for the coming year:
1942 Production
(After .Renegotiation*)

Materials ...........
Labor ..............
Burden .............

Engineering .........
Administrative ......
Royalties ...........

.

$1,417
258
38r

57.1
10.4
15-4

64
15i

2.6
6. 1
.4

ii

1943 Proposal

$ 8,076
1,261
1,552

126
567
........................

64.2
i0.0
12.3
1.0

4-5

Cost ...........

2,282

92.0

11,582

92.0

Profit...........

I98

8.o

i,oo6

8.o

$2,480

100.0

$12,588

ioo.o

Price (sales) .....

ooo omitted. The figures are shown after renegotiation in order to remove the element of
price inflation represented by excessive profits. This adjustment permits comparing the ratios to
sales of cost items in 1942 with the ratios in the 1943 proposal.

The proposal contemplates about five times the 1942 volume. By converting 1942 material costs to the greater volume, the historical material
cost becomes $7,i91,0oo as compared with the $8,o76,ooo stated in the

proposal. Since it seems reasonable that a close relationship will be maintained between material costs and sales, despite increased volume, this
cushion of nearly $900,0o0 in the material cost estimate requires further
investigation. The estimate of $1,552,000 for burden probably contains

contingency allowances, for the fixed items in burden should increase only
moderately, even if the variable items increase in direct proportion (which
is improbable), and the fixed items comprised approximately one-fifth of
the 1942 total. The estimate for administrative expenses, although smaller
percentagewise, shows a large dollar increase. This cannot be justified inasmuch as the bulk of these expenses in 1942 consisted of executive compensation.
Offhand it may appear that renegotiation contributed little or nothing
to this analysis, for procurement personnel ordinarily obtain cost breakdowns on completed contracts, and these figures can be compared with a
new proposal without utilizing renegotiation experience. The point is,
however, that unless so-called actual costs for a previous period or contract are tied into the overall operating statement of the company, they
are of questionable reliability. Only the overall approach of renegotiation
can make certain that the allocation of costs to a particular product or
contract is justified. Otherwise the contractor's "product costs" may be
no more than an arbitrary statement designed to suit best his interests of
the moment.
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Renegotiation occupies an especially strategic position with respect to
the scrutiny of costs, particularly those under the direct control of the
management. Not only is it the one occasion when the detail of such accounts as advertising, executive compensation, depreciation, and repair
and maintenance can be secured; it affords the only opportunity for applying a counterpressure to the forces which cause most contractors to regard these expenses indifferently, or even to increase them deliberately.
With corporate tax rates so high, it makes good sense (from a contractor's
point of view) to push allowable tax deductions to the limit; this is especially true when the prices that the company is receiving for its products
are more than ample to cover ordinary costs. Increased advertising expenses, if the bureau approves, thus become a wonderful investment-at
a net cost of roughly twenty cents on the dollar. Or take salaries. Here it is
not only to the company's interest tax-wise to up salaries, it is to the
officers' interests too. Even to maintain after-tax income requires substantial salary increases, but many companies have contrived to provide
their officers with larger after-tax incomes, despite the higher personal
tax rates.
The House Naval Affairs Coumittee was properly aroused:
We were somewhat disturbed to find that the Departments do not make a more
searching review of the expenditures of contractors. In view of the fact that one of the
prime functions of renegotiation is the scaling down of prices by the disallowance as
charges to the Government of improper items of cost, we think that the Price Adjustment Boards should devote more of their time to making a careful examination of the
facts upon which the financial statements submitted by the contractors are based.zo
Although the recent amendments to the act apparently restrict the
authority to disallow expenses, renegotiation is far from powerless, since
it can take into account high salaries in determining a reasonable profit.
For example, in analyzing the profits of a closely held corporation whose
principal stockholders and principal executives are identical-and by and
large such cases provide most of the flagrant salary increases-one may
properly add the ratio of profit to sales to the ratio of salaries to sales. If
ten per cent is considered a fair settlement where salaries total three per
cent of sales, a comparable company (all other factors, such as volume,
contribution, and efficiency, being similar) where salaries are six per cent
should certainly be settled somewhere near seven per cent. Otherwise the
company which upped salaries unreasonably comes off the winner.
And renegotiation officials can state bluntly what they think of unreasonable salaries, even though they do not believe that the bureau will
10 Supra, note *, at 30-31.
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actually make disallowances. They can inform the company that if it continues with such expenditures, it can expect far less favorable treatment
the next time it is renegotiated. This approach is clearly applicable to the
whole of general and administrative, and selling and advertising expenses,
and already there is sufficient evidence with respect to 1943 cases to conclude that it can bring results. As the problem is simply one of reorienting
the contractor's ideas as to where his interests lie, it is clearly part of the
larger one of pressures and incentives. One of the distinct virtues of renegotiation over aniy straight tax scheme yet suggested is its ability to
exert pressures and stimulate incentives to control costs.
Renegotiation has the tremendous advantage of dealing directly with
subcontractors and suppliers whom the procurement agencies ordinarily
never see. Since purchased materials and components often account for
more than half of the total prime contract price, examination of the prices
paid up and down the line is essential to a real pricing program. Even if
the only element of inflation were the profit, the opportunities for reducing
the price of the end-item would be considerable; but if both the profit and
cost approaches are utilized in renegotiation, and .if proper administration
stimulates the desired incentives, the opportunities are truly tremendous.
The renegotiation of 1942 cases suggests that the average overpricing approximates io per cent of the sales price (taking into account clearances
as well as refund cases and prime contractors and subcontractors alike)."'
Thus, on an average, if it be assumed that io per cent is a fair profit margin, every contractor in the production chain is getting 20 per cent. Let us
translate this into an example:

Supplier .............
Tool company .o......
Subcontractor ........
Prime contractor .....

Price*

Profit

50
1o

i0
20
30
40

150

200

. . .

Excessive
Prosi
Profit

5
10

IS
20
50

These figures are intended to represent dollar prices. Thus the tool company
pays the supplier $so, the subcontractor pays the tool company $xoo, the prime
pays the sub $z5o, and the Government pays the prime $2oo.

The total profit realized by the four producers in this series is $ioo out of
an end-price to the Government of $200. By recapturing 1o per cent of
xxIf clearances are eliminated, the average over-pricing is around 16 per cent. Renegotiation
of War Contracts, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., ist Sess., at 97.
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excessive profits from each producer, a total of $50 is taken, thus reducing
the end price to $i5o, on which the total profit taken by the four is only
$5o. With a chain of six producers the pyramiding is much greater:

Price

Supplier .............
Subcontractor ........
Tool company .......
Subcontractor ........
Subcontractor ........
Prime contractor .....

Profit

Excessive
Profi
Profit

5o

zo

5

zoo
15o

20
30
40

10
15
20

.oo
250
300

50

25

6o

30

210

105

Here the total profit is $210 out of a price of $300. A io per cent reduction
in the profit of each producer cuts the price by $io 5 to $195.
As a matter of fact these hypothetical cases are relatively mild. Many
instances are available of a series of producers, each of whose profits are
inflated by far more than io per cent. Unfortunately these series are difficult to trace, and only rarely does one renegotiating agency have the entire chain subject to its jurisdiction. The following examples, though incomplete, are in point:
PERCENTAGE OF
EXCESSIVE PROFITS TO SALES

Subcontractor ................................
Prime contractor .............................

25
23

Tool steel company ...........................
Tool company ................................
Prime contractor .............................

12
21

Forging company .............................
Subcontractor ................................

17
55

15

Subcontractor .............................. unknown
6.1E2
Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee prime contractor ...........

As might be expected, the subcontractors under the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
prime contractor are overpricing to the greatest extent. The cost-plus
prime contractor, his costs being guaranteed, feels no need to buy carefully. In fact if he did, his costs might drop so sharply that his fixed fee
would appear too large percentagewise, a probability which the following
instances of overpricing by subcontractors and suppliers under a cost-plus
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prime make clear. The prime here was in direct buying relationship with
these companies, which thus were first-tier subcontractors:
PERCENTAGE OF
EXCESSIVE
PROFIT TO
SALES

SUBCONTRACTOR

A ...................................... 31
B ...................................... 29
C ..................................... 26

D ...............................

28

E .....................................

30

F................................

38

Clearly renegotiation often provides information for judging the purchasing efficiency of a prime contractor. It should not be assumed that
only cost-plus contractors are careless buyers. Fixed-price prime contractors can and do have sufficiently large cushions in their prices to enable
them to adopt an easy-going attitude toward the prices which they pay to
subcontractors and suppliers. There are cases of prime contractors paying
a sub for an item double the price the Government is paying for the same
item under a prime contract. There are also instances of prime contractors
refusing price reductions proffered by their subs.
Here is a field where procurement personnel are handicapped by their
established policies of dealing with prime contractors only. But renegotiafion can and must utilize its extensive experience among subcontractors
to force down prices and call forth the incentives which will make each
producer in the chain from prime contractor to the lowest subcontractor
fully conscious that careful buying is essential. Admittedly this complicates the job of renegotiation. But unless this task is undertaken, costs
and profits on subcontract items will remain high long after prime contract profits have dropped to an apparently reasonable level-apparently
reasonable because the end-price will still be too high, and pyramiding,
although less obvious, will continue.
III
It is apparent that renegotiation as a technique has a great deal to contribute to procurement. One cannot be sure, however, that its peculiar
advantages and the information obtained through its operations have
been fully utilized. To date there has been insufficient pressure upon procurement officials to obtain close prices, and renegotiation itself has served
to reduce that pressure.
The contemplated termination of renegotiation puts the matter square-
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ly up to procurement officials: Can they carry on without the protection
which renegotiation affords? Can they obtain fair prices on the vast majority of items they must buy? Can they adapt their purchasing procedures and contract forms to the job of ensuring that excessive profits will
not arise? The action of Congress has thus gone far to restore needed pressures. Procurement officials now know that they must rely on their own
abilities and techniques and that they cannot forever count on renegotiation to serve as a backstop for wild pitches and foul balls. While it continues, therefore, renegotiation must work closely with procurement in a
joint effort to control profits, to cut costs, and to furnish the necessary incentive to contractors to keep costs low.
In general terms, it would seem that procurement officials must orient
their thinking toward the accomplishment of the following immediate
goals:
i. Thefullest possible utilizationof the results of renegotiation.This means
that procurement negotiators must study the reports of renegotiation and
the work papers which lie behind.
2. The development of a new sanction. Conceivably in some instances
procurement may be able to force a recalcitrant contractor into line by
threatening to place no further orders with him. In other instances, however, where the particular contractor's production is essential and consequently where his bargaining power is great, the judicious use of the mandatory order is called for.
3. Realization that the responsibilityfor fair prices and moderate profits
lies solely with procurement personnel. It will no longer do for procurement
negotiators to think lightly of any inadequacy or carelessness on their
part.
4. Careful scrutiny of comparative cost and comparative price data. This
means going into considerably greater detail than has been customary.
Renegotiation reports for one or two years will in most instances be available, and these will indicate the type of costs that the contractor has incurred and may currently be charging to government business.
5. Concernwith the overall effect of war contractingon the operations of the
contractor. In the case of a contractor whose major war work is with one
procurement agency, this problem is not insoluble. But where a company
is both a prime contractor for many different agencies and a subcontractor
or a sub-subcontractor for many different primes, it will be extremely
difficult for any one procurement agency to visualize the overall effects
of its policies and practices on that company. The interrelationship of the
prices and costs of the different items made by one manufacturer must
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constantly be kept in mind. For example, cancellation of a tank contract will result in an increase in the cost of a contractor's artillery carriages and landing ships, due to the necessity for increased absorption of
fixed overhead.
6. Close relationship between estimated profit margins and the risks of the
contractor. If the item is a difficult one which calls for precision work, the
contractor is properly entitled, to a higher return than is a contractor
manufacturing a simple item which he intends to subcontract extensively.
Although it is generally true that the provisions of prime supply contracts are fairly uniform, there are variations which substantially affect
the risks taken by the contractor. Where a contractor takes risks as a
result of conscientious close pricing, relief should be given him if he does
encounter uncontrollable hazards that take away his reasonably anticipated profit.'2
7. Exploitation of the present more favorable market conditions. The
Government now has substantially greater bargaining power than it had
during the emergency phase of procurement, while terminations and cutbacks afford it an opportunity to cancel out the inefficient and high-price
producer. A policy of selective awarding and cancelling of contracts will
have a direct effect on the incentive of producers. The stabilization of the
requirements for many items, moreover, makes possible an increased
element of competition in war procurement.
8. Increased use of contracts providingfor exemption from renegotiation.
Procurement must really be sure of its ground in these cases, however, and
such certainty can come only from a successful attempt to work along the
lines already suggested.
RenegotiatiQn, in turn, must set for itself certain immediate goals which
complement the current aims of procurement:
i. Speedier processing of cases. Efforts are now being made to complete
renegotiation cases within three months. Although this is a most difficult
goal in complicated cases, greater speed must be obtained in order that
the pressure on the contractor to reduce prices, backed up by historical
cost data, is instituted as soon as possible after the conclusion of a fiscal,
year.
2. Securing of product costs. In no instance should renegotiation be carried on without an effort to obtain accurate historical costs by product.
Where current costs are available, these too should be secured.
"2It is the policy of Headquarters, Army Service Forces, to utilize relief under the First War
Powers Act and Executive Order gooi in such a manner as to encourage close pricing. See Fain
and Watt, op. cit. supra note 3.
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3. Forwardpricing. Greater emphasis must be placed upon the securing
of specific price reductions in every case where the results for the prior
year indicate that present prices will probably result in excessive profits.
If a detailed revision of prices cannot be obtained, a general covenant to
reduce prices wherever possible should be included in the renegotiation
agreement. It might even be advisable to discuss prices, prior to discussing
recapture of excessive profits already realized. The problem will naturally
be much easier in the case of a contractor who manufactures a relatively
small number of items under contract with one procurement agency.
Where a contractor is renegotiated by one agency and prime contracts are
outstanding with other agencies, cooperation between the renegotiating
agency and the other services or Departments must be established. Pricing
and repricing necessarily must be accomplished in close cooperation with
procurement personnel, and in fact the War Department is presently undertaking a pre-renegotiation experimental pricing program. Its principal
aim is to introduce procurement personnel to the complex problems and
techniques of war contract pricing under circumstances permitting close
cooperation with renegotiation and the selection of the companies to be
dealt with. It may also serve to initiate pricing discussions prior to formal
renegotiation proceedings.
4. Relation of subcontractitems to the end-price (the prime contract price)
paid by the Government. Many of the most glaring instances of excessive
profits are realized by manufacturers of component parts and supplies
going into end-products. Since these items may pass through the hands of
other subcontractors before reaching the prime contractor, the possibilities for pyramiding profits are excellent. Where possible, the entire series
of producers must be considered together and measures taken to eisure
that price reductions by one subcontractor in the chain are passed along
by the other subcontractors above him and by the prime contractor to the
Government.
5. Penalizingof contractorswhose pricingpractices and profit margins are
unreasonable. A man who insists upon a thirty-three per cent profit or a
thirty-three per cent cushion of profit plus contingencies has eliminated
virtually all risks from his operations. It is not sufficient that he is willing
to refund a large portion of that cushion at the end of the year, as, his
risks having been reduced, his incentive to efficiency has likewise been all
but eliminated. Nor can a contractor in this situation get a clean bill of
health by making voluntary price reductions or refunds to the Government
toward the end of the year. Voluntary reductions are significant only if
their timing indicates a real intention to operate under close prices. A
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contractor who has reduced his risks to a minimum is entitled to little
more than a management fee, no larger than that paid a cost-plus-afixed-fee contractor.
6. Closer attention to the elements of controllablecost in price. Contractors
must be made to realize that unnecessary expenditures are not an unmixed tax advantage.
These or similar policy developments are necessary if the goal which
Congress believes can be achieved is to be achieved. Congress has supplied
the necessity. It remains now to be seen whether renegotiation and procurement will reorient their policies and procedures in order to permit renegotiation to come to an end without serious danger of national scandal.
A strong argument can be made for the proposition that no matter how
expert procurement becomes, some method of overall review, such as renegotiation, will continue essential. Constant changes in the quantities
and in the very products required by global war inevitably make cost
estimates problematic, and there is as yet nothing to indicate that government requirements are about to decline sharply. Consequently, the restoration of competitive conditions, which, Congress believes, will make con3
tinued renegotiation unnecessary, is most unlikely.'
But, apart from this circumstance, it must be remembered that certain
elements in factory overhead, together with most general and administrative, and selling and advertising expenses, have no reality as costs per
item except as historical costs per item. Even as historical costs they must
be determined by an arbitrary method of allocation which the Government, as the principal buyer, should have the right to review. Any estimate of this type of expense as to a given product is necessarily guesswork, in contrast to the reasonably ascertainable estimates of direct
material and direct labor costs. As a result, the contractor takes the
natural precaution of overestimating. This factor alone can, and does,
lead to excessive profits. At some stage in the procurement process, therefore, companies must be viewed as operating units over a past period,
whereas decentralized procurement as presently constituted functions for
The term 'termination date' means"(A) December 31, '944; or
"(B) If the President not later than December i, 1944, finds and by proclamation declares
that competitive conditions have not been restored, such date not later than June 30, 1945, as
may be specified by the President in such proclamation as the termination date;
"(C) If the President, not later than June 30, 1945, finds and by,proclamation declares that
competitive conditions have been restored as of any date within six months prior to the issuance of such proclamation, the date as of which the President in such proclamation declares
that competitive conditions have been restored"; Revenue Act of 1943, tit. VII, § 403 h.
13 "(2)
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the most part prospectively and always on an individual-contract basis.
It is doubtful, moreover, whether any one procurement agency ever can
successfully undertake an historical review from the overall vantage
point which renegotiation now occupies. If it did, it would become a renegotiating agency. The largest and most successful buyers among our
private enterprises, even when able to dictate terms and prices in advance,
have found most desirable a brand of "renegotiation" as a means of adjusting prices in light of historical profits and costs. The public interest
demands that the Government as a buyer be no less diligent.
Accepting renegotiation as indispensable does not mean placing war
procurement on a cost-plus basis. For renegotiation can influence costs and
make disallowances, and it can determine a reasonable profit to be anything from two to twenty-five per cent of sales. It thus provides the essential incentive for the increased production, quality, operating efficiency,
and control of costs needed to win the war, to check inflation, and to help
save the peace. In fact, enlightened self-interest should lead business to
support renegotiation. If, because of the easy-come, easy-go circumstances
of war procurement, large numbers of companies become careless about
costs, American industry will encounter rough going in the post war world,
and individual companies will find that profits do not flow to the inefficient. By causing contractors to think again of cost control, renegotiation can help them prepare for operating in an economy where sheer
productive capacity does not guarantee a handsome return.
The historical-minded will recall that the Dutch Empire went into
eclipse. As for the causes, it just could be that George Canning knew what
he was talking about.

